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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF CLINTON
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
LAMONT BAKER, #00-A-4845,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #09-1-2015-0468.14
INDEX #2015-1135
ORI #NY009013J

-against-

TINA M. STANFORD, Chairwoman,
New York State Board of Parole,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Lamont Baker, verified on August 11, 2015 and filed in the
Clinton County Clerk’s office on August 20, 2015. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Clinton Correctional Facility, is challenging the January 2015 determination denying him
discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The
Court issued an Order to Show Cause on August 28, 2015 and has received and reviewed
respondent’s Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on October 21,
2015 and supported by the Letter Memorandum of Christopher J. Fleury, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General, dated October 21, 2015. No Reply has been received from petitioner.
On August 22, 2000, petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County,
as a persistent violent felony offender, to a controlling indeterminate sentence of 16 years
to life upon his convictions of the crimes of Attempted Assault 1° and Criminal Possession
of a Weapon 2°. He made his initial appearance before a Parole Board on January 20, 2015.
Following that appearance petitioner was denied discretionary parole release and it was
directed that he be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial determination
reads as follows:
1 of 10

[* 2]

“FOLLOWING CAREFUL REVIEW AND DELIBERATION OF YOUR
RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THIS PANEL CONCLUDES THAT
DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS NOT PRESENTLY WARRANTED DUE TO
CONCERN FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.
THE
FOLLOWING FACTORS WERE PROPERLY WEIGHED AND
CONSIDERED: YOUR INSTANT OFFENSES IN MANHATTAN INVOLVED
ATT. ASSAULT 1ST AND CPW 2ND.
YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY INCLUDES BURGLARY, DRUG AND
WEAPON RELATED OFFENSES.
YOUR INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMMING INDICATES PROGRESS AND
ACHIEVEMENT WHICH IS NOTED TO YOUR CREDIT.
YOUR DISCIPLINARY RECORD REFLECTS THREE(3) TIER 2 AND
THREE(3) TIER 3 REPORTS. YOU HAVE SERVED SHU TIME.
YOU HAVE APPROXIMATELY FIVE(5) FELONIES AND ONE(1)
MISDEMEANOR. THIS IS YOUR THIRD(3) STATE BID.
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY, REHABILITATION
EFFORTS AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY REENTRY.
YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE, AT THIS TIME, WOULD THUS NOT
BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY AT LARGE, WOULD
TEND TO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INSTANT
OFFENSE(S), AND UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the January 2015 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on March 3,
2015. Although the Appeals Unit apparently failed to issue its findings and recommendation
within the four-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a belated decision on
administrative appeal was, in fact, issued on or about September 2, 2015, after this
proceeding had been commenced.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A, §§38f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released,
he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law. In making the
parole release decision, the procedures adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the
following be considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training
or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii)
release plans including community resources, employment, education and
training and support services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness
of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence, length of
sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney,
the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities
following arrest prior to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record,
including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous
probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-i(5)
unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon v.
Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the petitioner
makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume that the New
York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory requirements. See
Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521 and Zane v. New
York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.

A significant portion of the Petition focuses upon the argument that the Parole Board
failed to adequately consider all required statutory factors and instead relied
excessively/exclusively on the serious nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
incarceration. In this regard petitioner specifically alleges that he “ . . . successfully
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completed Phase 1 programe [sic] Vocational completion thruogh [sic] Industry
programing, A.R.T. [Aggression Replacement Training] program . . . forklift certification,
Hazardous material removal and has (6) six letters of reasonable assurances. These
accomplishment[s] coupled with limited disciplinary record at this parole hearing should
have weighed in petitioner favor for parole release . . . These accomplishments and release
plans of the petitioner were brushed over. There was only a brief discussion of what he did
in the (16) sixteen years that he served in prison and no real inquiry about his release
plans.”
Petitioner’s above arguments notwithstanding, a Parole Board need not assign equal
weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with a discretionary
parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its
written decision. See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d 903, app
dismissed 24 NY3d 1052, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State
Division of Parole, 47 AD 3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department,
the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the
Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed
the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not
contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing
process, given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor
equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New
York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Parole Board Report (Initial January 2015) and
transcript of petitioner’s January 20, 2015 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board
had before it information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including
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petitioner’s prior criminal record, his vocational, educational and therapeutic programing
records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary
record (three Tier II and three Tier III infractions) and release plans/community support
(including the six letters of reasonable assurance), in addition to information with respect
to the circumstances of the crimes underlying his incarceration. The Court, moreover, finds
nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole Board cut short petitioner’s
discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and
complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed, just prior to the close of the January 20, 2015
Parole Board interview one of the presiding commissioners inquired as follows: “Mr. Baker,
what else should we know before we close?” Petitioner responded that he “missed a lot of
opportunities with my child, I missed her growing up and graduating from high school and
I wish to re-establish my relationship with her.”

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the serious nature of the crimes underlying
petitioner’s incarceration, as well as his prior criminal record and prison disciplinary
history. See McAllister v. New York State Division of Parole, 78 AD3d 1413, lv denied 16
NY3d 707, Hall v. New York State Division of Parole, 66 AD3d 1322 and White v.
Dennison, 29 AD3d 1144.
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To the extent petitioner purports to rely on King v. New York State Division of
Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d 788, the Court finds such reliance to be misplaced.
In King the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that the Parole
Board improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with respect to
convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “ . . . to consider and fairly weigh
all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant under the
statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative achievements and
would appear to strongly militate in favor of granting parole.” Id. at 433. In July of 2014
the appellate-level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion referenced
by the Board in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the crime underlying
Mr. King’s incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police officer during the robbery of
a fast food restaurant). According to the Appellate Division, First Department, “[s]ince .
. . the Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude
parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent
seriousness of the crime itself.” Id. at 433.
This Court (Supreme Court, Clinton County) first notes that Mr. King had no prior
contacts with the law. Id. at 426. Petitioner, on the other hand, was sentenced in 2000 as
a persistent violent felony offender pursuant to Penal Law §70.08. In addition, although
the King court did not reference Mr. King’s disciplinary record, it characterized his overall
prison record as “exemplary.” Id. at 425. In addition, the parole denial determination in
King, as quoted by the Appellate Division, First Department, described Mr. King’s
institutional adjustment as “excellent.” Id. at 430. In the case at bar, however, petitioner’s
prison disciplinary record, as specifically referenced in the January 2015 parole denial
determination, includes three Tier II infractions and three Tier III infractions. It is also
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noted in the parole denial determination that petitioner served time in the Special Housing
Unit. It is clear, therefore, that the January 2015 parole denial determination was not based
exclusively on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration but, rather, was
also based on his disturbing record of prior violent felony offenses and his less than stellar
prison disciplinary record. In any event, in July of 2014 the Appellate Division, Third
Department - whose precedent is binding on this Court - effectively determined that the
“aggravating circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does
not represent the state of the law in the Third Department. See Hamilton v. New York
State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268. In Hamilton it was noted that the Third
Department “ . . . has repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that, so long as the
[Parole] Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive Law §259i(2)(c)(A)] it is ‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime’
(Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903 (2014)
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]’ . . .” Id at 1271 (other citations omitted).
After favorably citing nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and 2014, the
Hamilton court ended the string of cites as follows: “ . . . but see Matter of King v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other grounds 83 NY2d
788[1] (1994) [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that the
Board [of Parole] may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the crime

1

The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “ . . . one of the [Parole] Commissioners
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the
consequences to society if those sentences are not in place. Consideration of such factors is not authorized
by Executive Law §259-i.” 83 NY2d 788, 791. The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that aspect
of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination
must be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the
underlying crime.
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when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not
outweighing the seriousness of the crime].” 119 AD3d 1268, 1272. The Hamilton court
continued as follows:
“Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner’s
institutional behavior and accomplishments are ‘exemplary,’ the Board may
place ‘particular emphasis’ on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in
denying parole, as long as the relevant statutory factors are considered
(Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d at 905). In so holding we
explained that, despite [the Valderrama] petitioner’s admirable educational
and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history,
‘[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in
accordance with the requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject
to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety’ (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). We
emphasize that this Court [Appellate Division, Third Department] has
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing
denials of parole to petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary
records and as being compelling candidates for release.” 119 AD3d 1268, 1272
(additional citations omitted).
The Court therefore finds petitioner’s reliance on King to be misplaced.
The Court also finds that the January 2015 parole denial determination is sufficiently
detailed to inform petitioner of the reasons underlying the denial and to facilitate judicial
review thereof. See Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295 and Ek
v. Travis, 20 AD3d 667, lv dis 5 NY3d 862.

Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
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which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”2 To the extent petitioner

appears to argue that the Parole Board failed to apply the new procedures mandated
by the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4) to his case, the Court rejects such
argument. The Court finds that the promulgation of the October 5, 2011 memorandum
from Andrea W. Evans, then Chairwoman, New York State Board of Parole, satisfied the
Parole Board’s obligations with respect to the 2011 amendment to Executive Law §259c(4). See Partee v. Evans, 117 AD3d 1258, lv denied 24 NY3d 901, and Montane v. Evans,
116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d 903, app dis 24 NY3d 1052.
In the case at bar there is no doubt that a COMPAS risk and needs assessment
instrument was prepared in conjunction with the discretionary parole release consideration
process. The COMPAS instrument is part of the record in this proceeding and was
specifically discussed during the course of petitioner’s January 20, 2015 parole interview,
with one of the presiding commissioners noting that the COMPAS “ . . . assessment has you
at a low risk across the board, for felony violence, arrest or absconding.”
Although the Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined that a risk and
needs assessment instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with postSeptember 30, 2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d 1056,
Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and Garfield v. Evans, 108
AD3d 830), there is nothing in such cases, or Executive Law §259-c(4), to suggest that the
quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of the risk and needs assessment
instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the Parole Board to
determine, based upon its consideration of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-

2

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole supervision. The “risk and
need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to Executive Law §259-c(4), while
intended to measure the rehabilitation of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood that
he/she would succeed under community-based parole supervision, serve only to “ . . . assist
members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to
parole supervision . . .” Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added). Thus, while the Parole
Board was required to consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary
authority to determine whether or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody
to community-based parole supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the
COMPAS assessment and was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent
assessment of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) including, as here, the
serious nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration, his prior record of violent
felony offenses and his prison disciplinary record. See Rivera v. New York State Division
of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d 1258, lv
denied 24 NY3d 901.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

February 5, 2016 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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